Large-scale family planning programs may be more effective than is sometimes believed.
More than half of the inhabitants of the developing world probably live in countries that have some kind of national family planning program (1). In several of the smaller populations that have such programs-Hong Kong, Korea, Malaya, Singapore, and Taiwan in Asia and several islands of the West Indies-births rates definitely are declining (2) .
A lively debate is going on concerning the role, present and future, of large-scale family planning programs both in the small populations able to demonstrate declining birth rates and the larger populations for which declines in birth rate are still only a hope rather than a demonstrable fact (3) . Reservations on the part of the critics about the influence of national family planning programs are varied, but the following views are probably among the most important. 1) In concentrating on preventing unwanted births, programs set a goal whose achievement still will leave the rate of population growth much too high-that is, well above zero.
2) The programmatic successes of small, rapidly developing countries cannot be repeated in such crucial large populations as those of India or Indonesia.
3) Any declines in birth rate in countries like Taiwan or lusion of success, because of the following. (i) The women who accept the device are, in general, women of high parity (4) , who are too old to have many more children anyway. (ii) The programs are "skimming the cream"; acceptance rates must fall when the small, highly motivated high-parity group is exhausted. (iii) Discontinuation rates for the IUD's inserted (half or more of the women fitted with the IUD for the first time discontinue its use within 2 years) are so high that the result is little protection, little motivation for continued contraception, and little reduction in fertility. (iv) The net result is that few births are averted even for participants in these mass IUD programs. At best this means that use of the IUD is a poor method for mass family planning programs. The even gloomier interpretation is that such results are inevitable and that even less satisfactory outcomes might result from stress on alternative methods. Either the method is wrong or the population is just not ready.
This last set of arguments against the claimed success of the Taiwan and Korean programs is, in the aggregate, an argument that the programs are unsuccessful because they do not even enable those who participate to prevent any substantial number of births.
It is with this last set of issues that this article is concerned. We believe that there is substantial evidence for Taiwan, and some less completely analyzed evidence for Korea, which establishes the success of the programs, at least in the sense that (i) they have reached a part of the population for which the expectation of future births, in the absence of contraception, is high; (ii) as time goes on, they are reaching more rather than fewer couples who are still in the first half of their reproductive period; (iii) a substantial proportion of those who parTaiwan's family planning program began in early 1963 in the area of one of its principal cities, Taichung. At that time, with a birth rate of 36.3 per 1000 population and a death rate of only 6.1, Taiwan's population of 11.9 million was growing at a rate of 30 per 1000 and was expected to double in less than 24 years. Encouraged by the success of efforts in Taichung (5) Third, while the participating women are selected for above-average interest in family planning, they are also selected for higher-than-average fecundity, and this edge in fecundity increases very substantially with advancing age, as Table 2 dren. This latter selection is important because with advancing age the proportion of sterile couples increases. As one ascends the age scale the proportion of couples able to have children grows smaller and smaller, and participants in the IUD program tend to be drawn from this group. Thus the age-specific birth rates for all married women give a misleading picture of the potential fertility of IUD acceptors. The potential fertility of the older acceptors, even when the fact that many of them are substituting the IUD for other means of birth control is taken into account, is appreciably higher than would be indicated by average age-specific birth rates for married women. Note, for example, in Table 2 that during the 3 years prior to insertion of the IUD, the acceptors had higher fertility rates at each age than. the average married woman 5 years younger.
The net number of births averted per IUD inserted depends essentially on the length of time the device is retained and the potential fertility of the women during the period of retention. As we have seen, older women in the program have an advantage over younger ones with respect to retention but a disadvantage with respect to potential fertility in the absence of the IUD, since the aboveaverage fecundity for which they were selected cannot wholly compensate for the effects of aging upon fecundity or the greater likelihood that the IUD is being substituted for another method. According to the medium estimates of a recent analysis, summarized in Table 3 pact at the middle ages, roughly 25 to 34 years.
The foregoing analysis of births averted refers to the effects of only the first IUD inserted. It does not take into account either reinsertions or changes in subsequent birth control practice which are associated with acceptance in the program, as discussed below. Since these additional protections are generally associated with higher parity and greater age, the advantages for IUD acceptors, in terms of births averted, are even greater than the data of Table 3 indicate, and they increase differentially with age and parity.
Characteristics of Acceptors
As mentioned above, a second basic assumption in the argument that the IUD programs have had little direct impact is the assumption that motivation to adopt family planning methods is proportional to the number of children in excess of the desired number, and that therefore acceptance rates rise progressively with increasing age and parity. In fact, however, Taiwanese and Korean women are in general considerably younger, and their families are smaller, at the time they accept the IUD than the theories of the pessimists would Center, Taiwan, 1967) , appendix p. 6, Table 4 . 850 lead one to expect. As Table 4 shows, 50 to 60 percent of the Taiwanese and Korean women are in the favorable age range of 25 to 34 years. And as shown in Table 5 , there is a similar concentration of entries for parities 3 to 5. Eighty-five percent of the Taiwanese acceptors report having adopted the IUD to stop family growth rather than to space their children, and this proportion has remained constant throughout the period 1964 to 1967.
Plainly, IUD acceptors are not, as the pessimists see them, a small group of older women who already have many children and who accept the IUD belatedly, but, rather, a much larger and highly fertile group. They are women who have had all the children they want but who are still young enough and fertile enough to expect to have more unless they take preventive action. These women are realistic. They are motivated by a recent history of fertility which makes additional, unwanted births very probable.
The argument that the IUD acceptors are too old and already have too many children to be likely to have any more is invalid, then, on several counts. First, in age these women are bunched toward the middle rather than the end of the childbearing span. Second, they are not average women; they are women whose recent high fertility indicates a probability of some remaining years of above-average fertility. Third, the fact that almost all of the 22-percent decline in Taiwan's birth rate between 1959 and 1965 resulted from falling birth rates among women 30 years of age or older indicates that the reduction of fertility among "older" women is significant for general fertility decline (7) .
It is difficult to understand why some critics of the family planning programs insist that these programs will fail if they reach mainly women with large numbers of children. A large part of the difference in the birth rates of lessdeveloped and more-developed countries arises precisely from the fact that in the less-developed countries birth rates are higher for women in the middle and later portions of the reproductive period, and many more of the births are sixth, seventh, and higherorder children. In summarizing these facts in a recent paper (8) , Simon Kuznets points out that differences of age-specific birth rates in the age-range 25 to 34 account for about half of the difference in birth rates between the less-developed and the more-developed countries, and that one-quarter of the difference in the birth rates results from the higher birth rates at ages 35 The relatively large size of the target group in the IUD program also helps to explain another main finding. The program in Taiwan has been operative for 31/2 years, and there is no sign of decline in the rates of IUD acceptance. As the data of Table 6 show, acceptance rates have increased or at least have remained stationary in each 5- Table 7 ) indicate that the period of use for the IUD is about the same as that for the Ota ring but considerably longer than that for pills or traditional contraceptives. Discontinuation rates for the pill seem to be about as high in Korea as in Taiwan, but it must be stressed that the preliminary evaluations from Korea are not decisive, because the samples (10), Table 26 .
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are small and important fractions of the respondents are former users of the IUD. There is no cause as yet, then, for regretting that in the Taiwanese and Korean programs first priority was accorded the IUD rather than another of the existing methods, though the need to give attention in a mass program to more than one method must be admitted. The implications, for users of the IUD, of the published rates of discontinuation are less alarming than the pessimists insist they are. These rates are meaningful only in the larger context of what happens to the user who discontinues use of the device. According to the data of Table 8 , 30 months after the initial insertion, only about a quarter of the women retain the original device. However, during the same period, only 15 percent of the original group have borne a child, instead of the nearly 50 percent to be expected if no birth control were practiced. Obviously, the women who have ceased using the IUD are making extensive use of other procedures. In the most-cited figures on discontinuation, reinsertions are not taken into account. In Taiwan, 30 or more months after the first insertion, only 25 percent of the Taiwanese women had the first device in place, but 45 percent did have an IUD in place. An additional 28 percent had been sterilized or were using some other contraceptive, so that, even after 30 or more months, 73 percent were protected by sterilization or contraception. In addition to the protection provided by contraception, many were protected by abortion. Of all the pregnancies experienced by women who had terminated use of the IUD, more than 50 percent were aborted. The figure of 73 percent for women who, 30 months after original insertion of the IUD, were using some method of contraception or had been sterilized may be contrasted with 27 percent who had used contraception at any time before insertion of the first IUD.
In short, we can say that a very substantial proportion of the couples in the program are protected in one way or another 30 months after insertion of the first IUD. 
Births Prevented
The birth rates for women participating in the IUD program in Taiwan (9) have fallen sharply since their initial participation (Table 9) ; these rates are between 68 and 78 percent below the rates that would have been expected had there been no IUD program. The figure 68 percent is based on the conservative assumption that the birth rates for these women might otherwise have been those of the average Taiwanese married woman of their own age group. The figure 78 percent is based on recognition that the women participating in the program are more fecund than the average woman of their age group, and that their fecundity, had it not been for use of the IUD, would have continued to exceed the average for their age group by the same margin as it did in the 3 years prior to such use.
We must not claim too much. We are not asserting that these reductions in births were caused by the IUD program. After all, many of these women probably would have practiced some kind of birth control even had there been no program. Birth control practice was increasing before the program began, and birth control outside of the IUD program has been increasing since. What we are asserting with some confidence is that the several hundred thousand participants in the Taiwan program have, since entering the program, dramatically increased their birth control practice and decreased their fertility. This finding refutes the argument that the program is trivial because the participants are too old, too few, or too poorly motivated to practice con-traception with any persistence or with any significant effect on fertility.
Whether part or all of this change would have occurred had there been no IUD program is a complicated question. We hope we have established that something has happened which needs explanation. and that taking the next step in analyzing the effects of family planning programs is worthwhile.
The potential importance of the faamily planning programs in implementing policies of population control is recognized generally. However The contemporary context for reconstrUlCting China's ancient past does not differ dramatically from the historicist viewpoint just described. For example, in his syntheses of Chinese prehistory, Chang Kwang-chih (2) proposes a "nuclear area"-the plains of the Huangho-and describes the history of CLllture in this region from the paleolithic period throuLgh the cuLlminating civilization of Shang-Chou. However, this description is then stretched thin so as to cover prehistoric and early historic phenomena occurring outside of the nLlclear area; it beconies, in a sense, a reversion to the techniquLe of writing colonial history.
The only difference is chronological: thus the so-called prehistoric "Lungshanoid" is conceived in terms of dynastic succession and expansion as it spreads its enlightening influence throughout China, and, in the minds of sonie writers, into southeast Asia as well (3) . The nuclear area is a valid descriptive device, applicable to a particular sequence of events; it is not an explanation.
As anthropologists we know that the "barbarians" have cultural identity and 853 China at 1000 B.C.: A Cultural Mosaic Study of early Chinese civilization requires the delicate details of local culture histories.
